opinion gives less than it ought to the powers of reason; and

considers the principles of taste, which give all their authority

to the rules of art, as more fluctuating, and as having less solid

foundations than we shall find, upon examination, they really have.

The common saying, that tastes are not to be disputed, owes its

influence, and its general reception, to the same error which leads

us to imagine it of too high original to submit to the authority of

an earthly tribunal. It will likewise correspond with the notions

of those who consider it as a mere phantom of the imagination, so

devoid of substance as to elude all criticism.

We often appear to differ in sentiments from each other, merely

from the inaccuracy of terms, as we are not obliged to speak always

with critical exactness. Something of this too may arise from want

of words in the language to express the more nice discriminations

which a deep investigation discovers. A great deal, however, of

this difference vanishes when each opinion is tolerably explained

and understood by constancy and precision in the use of terms.

We apply the term taste to that act of the mind by which we like or

dislike, whatever be the subject. Our judgment upon an airy

nothing, a fancy which has no foundation, is called by the same

name which we give to our determination concerning those truths

which refer to the most general and most unalterable principles of

human nature, to works which are only to be produced by the

greatest efforts of the human understanding. However inconvenient

this may be, we are obliged to take words as we find them; all we

can do is to distinguish the things to which they are applied.

We may let pass those things which are at once subjects of taste

and sense, and which having as much certainty as the senses

themselves, give no occasion to inquiry or dispute. The natural

appetite or taste of the human mind is for truth; whether that