or false, we naturally adopt and make our own; they may be

considered as a kind of inheritance to which we succeed and are

tenants for life, and which we leave to our posterity very near in

the condition in which we received it; not much being in anyone

man's power either to impair or improve it.

The greatest part of these opinions, like current coin in its

circulation, we are obliged to take without weighing or examining;

but by this inevitable inattention, many adulterated pieces are

received, which, when we seriously estimate our wealth, we must

throwaway. So the collector of popular opinions, when he embodies

his knowledge, and forms a system, must separate those which are

true from those which are only plausible. But it becomes more

peculiarly a duty to the professors of art not to let any opinions

relating to that art pass unexamined. The caution and

circumspection required in such examination we shall presently have

an opportunity of explaining.

Genius and taste, in their common acceptation, appear to be very

nearly related; the difference lies only in this, that genius has

superadded to it a habit or power of execution. Or we may say,

that taste, when this power is added, changes its name, and is

called genius. They both, in the popular opinion, pretend to an

entire exemption from the restraint of rules. It is supposed that

their powers are intuitive; that under the name of genius great

works are produced, and under the name of taste an exact judgment

is given, without our knowing why, and without being under the

least obligation to reason, precept, or experience.

One can scarce state these opinions without exposing their

absurdity, yet they are constantly in the mouths of men, and

particularly of artists. They who have thought seriously on this

subject, do not carry the point so far; yet I am persuaded, that

even among those few who may be called thinkers, the prevalent