conscious on any occasion. We may suppose a uniformity, and

conclude that the same effect will be produced by the same cause in

the minds of others. This examination will contribute to suggest

to us matters of inquiry; but we can never be sure that our own

sensations are true and right till they are confirmed by more

extensive observation.

One man opposing another determines nothing but a general union of

minds, like a general combination of the forces of all mankind,

makes a strength that is irresistible. In fact, as he who does not

know himself does not know others, so it may be said with equal

truth, that he who does not know others knows himself but very

im perfectly.

A man who thinks he is guarding himself against Prejudices by

resisting the authority of others, leaves open every avenue to

singularity, vanity, self-conceit, obstinacy, and many other vices,

all tending to warp the judgment and prevent the natural operation

of his faculties.

This submission to others is a deference which we owe, and indeed

are forced involuntarily to pay.

In fact we are never satisfied with our opinions till they are

ratified and confirmed by the suffrages of the rest of mankind. We

dispute and wrangle for ever; we endeavour to get men to come to us

when we do not go to them.

He therefore who is acquainted with the works which have pleased

different ages and different countries, and has formed his opinion

on them, has more materials and more means of knowing what is

analogous to the mind of man than he who is conversant only with

the works of his own age or country. What has pleased, and

continues to please, is likely to please again: hence are derived