Now this appeal implies a general uniformity and agreement in the

minds of men. It would be else an idle and vain endeavour to

establish rules of art; it would be pursuing a phantom to attempt

to move affections with which we were entirely unacquainted. We

have no reason to suspect there is a greater difference between our

minds than between our forms, of which, though there are no two

alike, yet there is a general similitude that goes through the

whole race of mankind; and those who have cultivated their taste

can distinguish what is beautiful or deformed, or, in other words,

what agrees with or what deviates from the general idea of nature,

in one case as well as in the other.

The internal fabric of our mind, as well as the external form of

our bodies, being nearly uniform, it seems then to follow, of

course, that as the imagination is incapable of producing anything

originally of itself, and can only vary and combine these ideas

with which it is furnished by means of the senses, there will be,

of course, an agreement in the imaginations as in the senses of

men. There being this agreement, it follows that in all cases, in

our lightest amusements as well as in our most serious actions and

engagements of life, we must regulate our affections of every kind

by that of others. The well-disciplined mind acknowledges this

authority, and submits its own opinion to the public voice.

It is from knowing what are the general feelings and passions of

mankind that we acquire a true idea of what imagination is; though

it appears as if we had nothing to do but to consult our own

particular sensations, and these were sufficient to ensure us from

all error and mistake.

A knowledge of the disposition and character of the human mind can

be acquired only by experience: a great deal will be learned, I

admit, by a habit of examining what passes in our bosoms, what are

our own motives of action, and of what kind of sentiments we are