prejudices. And since they deserve, on account of their duration

and extent, to be considered as really true, they become capable of

no small decree of stability and determination by their permanent

and uniform nature.

As these prejudices become more narrow, more local, more

transitory, this secondary taste becomes more and more fantastical;

recedes from real science; is less to be approved by reason, and

less followed in practice; though in no case perhaps to be wholly

neglected, where it does not stand, as it sometimes does, in direct

defiance of the most respectable opinions received amongst mankind.

Having laid down these positions, I shall proceed with less method,

because less will serve, to explain and apply them.

We will take it for granted that reason is something invariable and

fixed in the nature of things; and without endeavouring to go back

to an account of first principles, which for ever will elude our

search, we will conclude that whatever goes under the name of

taste, which we can fairly bring under the dominion of reason, must

be considered as equally exempt from change. If therefore, in the

course of this inquiry, we can show that there are rules for the

conduct of the artist which are fixed and invariable, it implies,

of course, that the art of the connoisseur, or, in other words,

taste, has likewise invariable principles.

Of the judgment which we make on the works of art, and the

preference that we give to one class of art over another, if a

reason be demanded, the question is perhaps evaded by answering, "I

judge from my taste"; but it does not follow that a better answer

cannot be given, though for common gazers this may be sufficient.

Every man is not obliged to investigate the causes of his

approbation or dislike.