receptions (the response to Maner’s “Olympia” and a Courbet review in the Temple Bar Magazine) that revealed to me the analytic and human power of a certain kind of social criticism. My greatest critical debt is not to him; Jerry McGann is the first and last influence on all my thinking, and he is also the best friend anyone ever had. Tim Clark’s was the discourse, however, that materialized for me the acts of knowing and forgetting that get accomplished by style.

Marilyn Butler read the “Tintern Abbey” chapter of this book a long time ago and when it had many more faults than it does now. Hers was the first outside response and it was then and continues to be a reason to persist in what has seemed to some a murderous dissection.

David Simpson has been a tireless and perfectly selfless supporter of my work over several years. He has made the kind of collegial commitment to my critical interests I hope to make to others.

References to Wordsworth’s poetry are to the standard, five-volume Hutchinson de Selincourt edition, except in the case of The Prelude, where I used the Norton edition (Jonathan Wordsworth, M. H. Abrams, Stephen Gill). I use the 1850 Prelude unless otherwise designated. Prose references are to Owen and Snyder. I thank Edmund Butler who read the manuscript for textual errors and helped standardize my references where I had used alternative texts.


Introduction

I

A new word is abroad these days in Wordsworth scholarship—“historicism”—and the adjective carries distinctly heterodox overtones. What is thereby refused is an idealizing interpretive model associated with Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman, Paul de Man, and even M. H. Abrams. At the same time, historicist critique distinguishes its interests and method from historical scholarship, or from the researches and argumentation of David Erdman, Carl Woodring, and E. P. Thompson. More specifically, a number of works published over the last three years position themselves as demystifications of Romanticist readings as well as of Romantic poems. They use history, or sociopolitical reconstruction, to resist the old control of Yale. However, insofar as they repudiate the empiricist, positivist concept of historical fact, in that they focus textual antinomy and erasure rather than manifest theme and achieved form, and in that they use their historical remove with conscious opportunism, these works are deeply of the devil’s party.

By way of illuminating this curious consensus, I would like to situate this book in the general field of Romantic criticism over the past ten or fifteen years, and then within the very different context of today. My project took shape some five years ago in a critical climate which I perceived as unimpeachable to the contextual elucidation of Wordsworth’s poetry. By contextual, I refer not to an academically contoured intellectual or literary domain, but to a factual universe: the place of political realities and of the ideological pressures that organize this material into determinate sociopsychic experience. The context I hoped to reconstruct from and around the poetry was not, in other words, a formal or heuristic category (e.g., Rousseauian primitivism, associational psychology, literary ballad) but something closer to an ‘extrinsic’ referential universe. I had the persistent feeling that Wordsworth’s most generalized representations owed their pronounced ideality to some disturbing...
particular and to the need to efface or elide it. This suspicion – neither a theoretically derived (Freudian, Marxian) assumption, nor a heretical gesture – arose from my efforts to teach the great period poems to undergraduates, who had not learned not to ask irrelevant and irreverent questions. They wondered why, for example, in a poem commonly known as “Tintern Abbey” and, by its title, very concretely situated with respect to time and place of composition, there is no mention of an abbey, and only the most generalized treatment of occasion. When I reflected on this discrepancy – a logical contradiction between title and text – it occurred to me that the amassing harmonies of Wordsworth’s poem effectively muffle the social and political resonance of the date inscribed in the title, of the designated five-year interval, and of the scene of writing. As I began to recover that resonance – a semantic dimension – I saw that it did not dilute, discredit, or remain extrinsic to the poem’s psychological and metaphysical argument. Quite the contrary, these new meanings, that related Wordsworth’s existential Angst to his own less mediated experience, as to the truth of his moment and his nation, materialized what had come to seem an impossibly displaced and textualized meditation. It became clear, for example, that many of “Tintern Abbey”’s most innocent affirmations – doctrinal and iconic – signify within the universe of contemporary social discourse as negations. Under the sign of history, Wordsworth offers the growth of a poet’s mind: a privatized, self-generative, and causally perspicuous sequence. So smooth, sealed, and, in the language of “Tintern Abbey,” purified a history does the poem develop, that history in the commoner sense, and the condition of Wordsworth’s historiography, have no room to surface.

Those commonplaces, and their relation to the uncommon wisdoms Wordsworth produces from them, were my quarry. My idea was not to produce the concealed subjects and occasions of Wordsworth’s poetry like rabbits from a hat, nor was it (and perhaps this amounts to the same thing), to reevaluate his most celebrated and transcendent poems with reference to some standard of first and final Truth. John Goode, in his excellent study of Gissing, puts the matter clearly and concisely: we do not expect “absolute veracity” from any fiction, but rather “a veracity made true by the historic significance of its mode of idealisation.” Plainly, one cannot gauge the nature or success of the idealization until and unless one restores to the work that ‘actual’ (a congeries of conditions experienced by an epoch as its given Real) which the form so uniquely, so interestingly, and with such complete necessity makes symbolic. Far from seeking to depreciate Wordsworth’s transcendence or to trivialize profoundly moving works, I hoped to renew our sense of their power by exposing the conditions of their success: that recalcitrant facticity with which they had to contend, explicitly and unconsciously. Neither was the point of this exercise to invert the old, idealizing control, and designate as either superior or typical those works revealing the most conflicted relation to their moment. That line of thought would, of course, merely replace one Romantic agony with another. My object was to explain the particular and particularly constrained manner in which Wordsworth sought figurally, mythically, or formally to resolve those conflicts which were his idées fixes, so to speak, his ideological knowledges.

The ablest practitioner of the method I sketch (and the best thing that has happened to Wordsworth studies in the past ten years) is John Barrell. While Barrell is everywhere and passionately concerned to restore diverse representational decisions to their determining social contexts, he also refuses – practically and theoretically – the referential privileging that tends to accompany such elucidations and to hypostatize the critic’s own working knowledge. Barrell offers, for example, a cautionary critique of a writer who “ignores the surface” of Constable’s paintings, the attempts to “conceal the pain of agricultural labour,” as if that surface “is only vanishing to be cleaned off before we can see Constable in his true colours.” Barrell compares this approach to Raymond Williams’s notion of ‘real history’ – “what really happened in the agrarian history of England when we have stripped away the nostalgia and mythologizing ...” Barrell reminds us that “the myths really happened as well, and the human significance of Constable’s pictures ... is not simply what they cannot help divulging about the rural life in 1810 or 1820, but also what they choose to tell us.” We might recall in this context Paul Ricoeur’s comment on his ‘Dialectic.’ Where Ricoeur writes “psychoanalysis” and “the Freudian problematic,” we might substitute “Wordsworth” and “the Cartesian problematic.”

Psychoanalysis is limited by what justifies it ... It is precisely this internal limitation of the Freudian problematic that will invite us, in a first phase, to oppose to it another explanatory point of view ... and then, in a second phase, to find in psychoanalysis itself the reason for going beyond it. The
task of that second reading is not so much to unmask the repressed and the agency of repression in order to show what lies behind the masks, as to set free the interplay of references between signs ... The only thing that gives a presence to the artist's fantasies is the work of art; and the reality thus conferred upon them is the reality of the work of art itself within a world of culture.4

Barrell's respect for the reality of the appearance— the depth that is Constable's surface—highlights the question of style in Wordsworth's poetry. Or, one might study Wordsworth's mythic resolution of logically insoluble problems (what E. P. Thompson has called "search for a synthesis at a moment of arrested dialectic" and what we might conceive as an ideological compromise formation), in terms of the textual procedures that transform lived contradiction into the appearance of aesthetic complexity.5 By these procedures, historically produced difference is mobilized into spatial and doctrinal design, and where there was unworkable, unspeakable loss, there is redemptive, figural definition. Because criticism has for so long and so volubly articulated Wordsworth's impulses from vernal woods, it is difficult to remember that the dominant effect of his poetry—its peculiar style—is its extreme artlessness, an apparent absence of style. In Arnold's phrase, Wordsworth's poetry is most distinctive when it is least distinctive, when it is 'as inevitable as Nature herself'.

Much of the recent historiist work on Wordsworth addresses poems or parts of poems that sketch (ambivalently, of course) the social dimensions of their primary representations. The later portions of The Prelude, The Excursion, "The Old Cumberland Beggar," "Guilt and Sorrow"— these are all predictably inviting subjects of explication. Marilyn Butler's brisk, trenchant positioning of "Laodamia" and some of the lyrical ballads, Jerome McGann's reading of "A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal," and David Simpson's treatment of "Alice Fell" and "The Reverie of Poor Susan," are the exceptions.6 They remind us that Wordsworth is most distinctively Wordsworth, most Romantic, and most successful in those poems where the conflicts embedded in his materials, motives, and methods are most expertly displaced and where, as a result, the poetry looks most removed from anything so banal as a polemic or position.

The poems I present—"Tintern Abbey," "Michael," the Intimations Ode, "Peele Castle"—are not only incontestably among the poet's greatest works, they are preeminent examples of that 'inevitability' so valued by readers such as Arnold, Pater, and Mill. These poems speak not a word about those sociopolitical themes which had occupied Wordsworth and others less than a decade before and which had become, in the light of the post-Revolutionary world, awkward on a number of levels. My argument is that the extreme disinterest evinced by these works indicates their resumption of those problematic themes at the level of image and of metaphysics, precisely because they were deadlocked at the practical level. More simply, these poems seek to resolve formally, through certain representational strategies, issues that were unthinkable under any but the most sublime—the most discursive—conditions.

Another reason these works solicited my attention is that while they appear to emerge with complete spontaneity and to owe their utterance to the profoundest, most diffuse and ineffable motivations, each poem perversely advertises its occasional, topical character. I ask the reader to recall, for example, Wordsworth's letter to Fox, where the poet identifies the social purposes informing his "Michael" and "The Brothers." Alarmed by that letter, we focus references within Wordsworth's "pastoral" to disarming socioeconomic trends particularly evident in the Lake District. Or consider the title of "Tintern Abbey," which, with its prolix explicitness, underlines the multiple anniversaries, national and personal, marked by the date of composition, and the very public meanings lodged in the landscape that the poem registers by negation. Similarly, the Intimations Ode, largely composed on the day which concluded the ignominious Peace of Amiens, alludes with a strange, typological specificity to ostensibly generic items, and it develops its lofty metaphysical argument by way of a historically specific and, at the time of composition, distinctly polemical representational style.

The object of each of these poems is to replace the picture of the place with "the picture of the mind," such as it might be at any time and in any place. The structural device by which this usurpation is achieved is repetition or return. In "Tintern Abbey," the Intimations Ode, and "Peele Castle," the narrator returns in fact or memory to a scene darkly overwritten by determinate social meanings and the psychic conflicts precipitated by those meanings. The original scene is registered stylistically and through the pattern of negations that the verse develops.7 The intention of the narration is to de- and re-figure the real, so that the narrator—poet may restore continuity to a socially and psychically fractured existence. The larger boon sought by the poet and offered to his contemporary
reader was the displacement of ideological contradiction to a context where resolution could be imagined and implemented with some success.

II

Some time ago, E. P. Thompson sought to undermine the assumption, common among Wordsworthians at that time, that the poet’s artistic success was a function of his political disengagement. In the view of M. H. Abrams, for example, “the great Romantic poems were written not in the mood of revolutionary exaltation but in the later mood of revolutionary disillusionment or despair,” when “the militancy of overt political action” had evolved into “the paradox of spiritual quietism.”

Thompson’s campaign, assisted by David Erdman and Carl Woodring, aimed to prove that Wordsworth’s great art emerged from the tension between his “Jacobin affirmation and recoil.” Once this tension evaporated, the poetry contracted and settled into “a point of rest.”

What Thompson and his fellow workers could not, given their critical moment, address, were the subtler languages of politics in Wordsworth’s poetry, and the way these languages inform and inflect the manifest doctrine of the poetry, as well as its innocent aesthetic decisions. These scholars brilliantly illuminated that doctrine – the presented themes of the poetry – by restoring the social and political discourses wherein those themes were first articulated. Their research was not, however, directed toward textual intervention. Their arguments – astute and completely persuasive – could not change one’s fundamental sense of the poetry, an impression determined by particular representational procedures, or the text’s imperceptible way of framing its world and its readers.

While the historians were conducting their investigations, Harold Bloom, Geoffrey Hartman, and Paul de Man seized as their Wordsworthian truth the great epistemological and ontological arguments of the poetry – arguments developed by the poet and his exegetes in what was, to all appearances, a disinterested, philosophic fashion. These scholars investigated the subtle negotiations whereby the mind of Man knew, ‘married,’ and redeemed (‘humanized’) Nature. They read both those agents, Mind and Nature, more or less sympathetically, or as they figure in the poetry.

As Bloom, Hartman, and de Man developed their remarkable theoretical talents, one could look back on their practical criticism and appreciate the logic of their attraction to deconstructive thought (or, of their interpretation of that thought). Wordsworth’s poetry – with its reception protocols, its narrative contingencies, its reflexivity, its thematicizing of figuration and desire, discourse and plenitude, repetition and reproduction – in short, its irony and aporia, provided deconstructive theory with a perfect, that is, perfectly accommodating model of the literary. To put this more polemically, Romanticism’s ideology of writing is deconstruction’s ideology of reading. The reasons for this identity are various and complex. Gerald Graff, in his Literature Against Itself, offers a sociopolitical analysis of the Romantic ideology, then and now, and Terry Eagleton, more sketchily but very suggestively, situates Yale’s resistance to the “terrorism of determinate meaning” within the context of less academic horrors: specifically, the Holocaust. The Romantics, we recall, and especially the first-generation poets, knew apocalypse and terror as well: the Revolution and Napoleon. The origin and evolution of critical methodologies is not my subject. I merely observe that the marriage of Romantic poetry and contemporary semiotic theory was perhaps happier for the theory than for the poetry. In Wordsworth’s case, the effect of this critical liaison was further to attenuate an already idealized canon, and to defend it more securely from properly historical interrogations. The more deliciously were we teased out of thought, the less likely were we to pose the kinds of questions (“Who are these . . . To what green altar . . . What little town . . .”) that would arrest the sport.

While Thompson and Erdman were reconstructing Wordsworth, and Yale was deconstructing him, M. H. Abrams was busy at Cornell with his own project, which was located somewhere beyond history and before theory. In his Natural Supernaturalism and several landmark essays, Abrams related Wordsworth’s and his generation’s political concerns to certain formal and stylistic issues. Whereas the stricter historians were textually noninvasive, Abrams’s interest in the political commitment of the early poetry, and the ‘quietist’ or retired mode of the post-Revolutionary verse, sensitized him to the topical meanings carried by the poetry’s nonthematic features. He perceived, for example, that certain very general, and, it seemed, perfectly innocuous words, such as “hope,” were in fact politically charged “leitmotifs” focusing specific contemporary debates.
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Abrams’s subject, however, was the big picture — the general and relatively conscious poetic response to the failure of the Revolution. The chrstological concept he so brilliantly discovered in the poetry, and which he used to explain the carryover and transformation of those leitmotifs and interests, was a greatly enabling idea of order, but it further rationalized and totalized works which were subtly but deeply scored by contradiction.

Marilyn Butler’s work takes up where Abrams (and Thompson, Erdman, and Woodring) leaves off. In her *Jane Austen and the War of Ideas, Peacock Displayed*, and most dramatically, *Romantics, Rebels and Reactionaries*, she brings her impressive historical erudition to bear on the most innocent aspects of the work: a word, a character type, a narrative donnée. By recovering and elucidating the polemical meanings of those representations and procedures in their originary context, she gives her readers a more authentic and immediate relation to the literature. To focus Romantic Hellenism, for example, as a reaction to a contemporary ideological conflict and its literary inscription, is to understand the deeply political character of this Romantic escape, this ‘luxury.’ It is to register concretely the difference between the apolitical and the anti- or adversarially political.

Butler’s work makes of us informed contemporary readers of Romantic literature; what she does not do is use her belatedness to theorize that within or about the work which the informed contemporary reader could not possibly know but which we, not so informed, can. Or, to put this another way, what Abrams did not do was to present the contradiction implied by his findings: on the one hand, a smooth, generalized, metaphysically preoccupied surface, and on the other, the historically specific, ideologically expressive, and greatly problematic methods that produced that manifest representation. Structuralism, by way of deconstruction, materializes textual absence and identifies its semiotic charge, so to speak; the reconstructive efforts of Thompson through Butler expose the faceted nature of works that present to our view a single plane. What was wanted was a way to mediate those projects, a theory of negative allegory.

Such a theory emerges in this generation from the work of Louis Althusser, Terry Eagleton, Fredric Jameson, and Pierre Macherey, and it is deployed in the more practical studies of John Barrell, James Chandler, T. J. Clark, John Goode, Kurt Heinzelman, Kenneth Johnston, Alan Liu, Jerome McGann, David Simpson, and James Turner. These writers, at once materialist and deconstructive, represent the literary work as that which speaks of one thing because it cannot articulate another — presenting formally a sort of allegory by absence, where the signified is indicated by an identifiably absent signer. Here, for example, is Althusser’s defense of a particular but representative hermeneutic move.

No doubt this was to add something to Marx’s discourse: but in a different respect, I was merely re-establishing, i.e., maintaining his discourse, without yielding to the temptation of his silence. I heard this silence as the possible weakness of a discourse under the pressure and repressive action of another discourse, which takes the place of the first discourse in favour of this repression, and speaks in its silence: the empiricist discourse. All I did was to make this silence in the first discourse speak, dissipating the second. That silence or ‘unspeakable’ (Jameson’s “logical scandal,” Macherey’s “rupture” and “fissure,” Bakhtin/Volosinov’s “intonation,” Della Volpe-McGann’s “quid”), inheres within the work and can determine its peripheral contours as well. The internal scandal occurs in those syntactic, dramatic, thematic, affective, and rhetorical contradictions that so deeply made (produced) and make (constitute) the work as to be nearly imperceptible to readers who share that work’s field of vision, what these writers call its problematic. The omission of the picture of the place (as opposed to ‘mind’) from “Tintern Abbey” is a contradiction of this kind, a thematic/iconic bind. The syntactic contradiction in line 33 of “Peele Castle” (“So once it would have been, — ‘tis so no more”: opposition of a past conditional to a present indicative, thereby suppressing the unconditional past, i.e., the so once it was), locates another such node. Precisely where the work blurs its manifest representations and where its smooth surface thickens, invaginates, or breaks open, is where its ideological situation can begin to take shape for us. These places — quite literally, spots of time, or deposits of historicity — are where the privatized ‘world’ of the poem (Abrams’s “heterocosm”) confesses its possession by the world, “the place where, in the end, / We find our happiness, or not at all” (*The Prelude*, Book 11, lines 143–44).

To focus these contradictions does not mean to discount the work’s manifest themes and rhetoric, or what used to be called its achieved form. The idea is that criticism take possession of these trouble spots, or take up a position within but not of the ideology it
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seeks to articulate: a position at once intimate and removed. Criticism can use these logical binds to plot the polemic developed by the work’s most spontaneous moves and its readiest materials: their reactive and dialectical, as well as their celebratory and more simply reflective dimensions. To read in this way is to split the atom of Romantic symbolism and organicism. Less flamboyantly, it is to set image against idea, form against content, process against product, in the hope that we may thus compel a tired organic apparition to reveal its fabulous fusions.

It is difficult to read Wordsworth in this conscientiously contentious way because the poetry explicitly rebukes even the gentlest material interest. Consciously or otherwise, one wants to defer to that celebrated, seductive instruction—let the feeling give importance to the incidents. What we must bear in mind is that we cannot use Wordsworth’s protest on behalf of the inner life and his rejection of an obsequious mimesis, unless we first and continuously try to reproduce his universe of objects considered as objects, and the historically specific conditions of his apprehension and representation of that universe. This is the kind of work that leads to a knowledge of Wordsworth’s achievement, since this—the object world and its modes of availability—is what the expressive and the heterocosmic orientations refuse.

Another textual obstacle to the sort of exercise I describe is that spectacular agon of self and other enacted throughout Wordsworth’s great period poetry. Clearly, a deconstructive materialism must ultimately undermine the categorial distinctions which that Cartesian dynamic enforces: meaning—psyche—poetry vs. matter—sociality—history. Students of Shakespeare, Donne, Milton, Pope, Johnson, Joyce, Whitman, and Lowell are better positioned to perceive the slippages whereby the mind’s idea and the heart’s desire and all that is conceived as external and inimical to that privileged (and therefore threatened) interiority, in factproduce, reproduce, and invade each other. Wordsworth’s later poetry, like that of Coleridge, Shelley, and most passionately, Keats, mythically figures that enfolding—an interpenetration of private and public domains—but in the poetry of Wordsworth’s great period, those ontological and social blendings or vortices are registered as contamination and they are fiercely resisted. The unacknowledged knowledge that Imagination and Nature are not only not distinct (and therefore not liable to prolific marriages) but are, equally, indifferent avatars of historical consciousness and its severe conditions, is the unthinkable in Wordsworth’s poetry. This is the logical scandal, and the place where the directly humanitarian concerns of the early poetry can be seen to determine the bent of the later (1807 volume) poems and more surprisingly, the institutional impersonalities of The Excursion.

The trend in Wordsworth criticism today—and I do mean today—is crystallized by the phrase, “historical imagination.” By this phrase, criticism names its belief that ideology is exactly that outside or social, which is invisible as such (that is to say, which is experienced as Nature or the order of things) precisely because it has so perfectly framed what is inside: psyche. The oxymoronic phrase, “historical imagination” (like “natural supernaturalism” or, for that matter, lyrical ballad, a peculiarly apt Romantic motto) organizes a criticism which seems to older, historical scholars, unnecessarily and therefore inaccurately ingenious (and, to deconstructionists, tediously circumstantial and recidivist). I refer to the procedure employed throughout this book, whereby a manifold of contemporary meanings, originally associated with or systematically informing the poet’s representations, is restored to a work which defines by its illogical affirmations the contours of that repressed material. The deconstruction proceeds by way of this reconstructed alterity, situated by the critic at the heart of the manifest discourse. The spectacle of this re- and de-construction is offered to the reader as an opportunity to appreciate the historically actualized human character of works that have been so powerfully abstracted and idealized—so canonized, in short—that all we can do is admire them.

Today’s younger Romanticists, and bold older ones, are trying to mediate Yale and the historians, not just because knowledge will be used (one cannot unknow Derrida), but because they have begun to appreciate the profounder meanings of Romantic irony, or of a poetry which extends its enchantments in great good faith, requires of its readers a willing suspension of disbelief, and all the while criticizes itself and those complaisant readers mercilessly for their illusions and elisions. Visually, one might conceive this poetry as one of those silhouettes which works from both the dark and the light side, figure and ground ever reversible and contingent, and refusing simultaneous figural motivation by a single observer.

The dark ground which defines Wordsworth’s poetry is, first or finally, that sense of lost things which engenders all human creation,
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but the form which those losses assume through the language of the poetry and of the age is deeply specific. Wordsworth’s grief in 1806, one year after the death of his brother, is, whether we are aware of it or not, moving and interesting to us precisely because it is so different from one’s own real or imagined griefs. And that difference is a function of the diverse contemporary meanings subsumed by that death — a function of the historicity of that loss and the representation of it.

The death of John Wordsworth was, to the poet, a class loss, containing a collection of losses and betrayals, many of them drawn from what we might call, the public sector. The poet does not speak these things; he does not draw the arrow leading from private grief to public critique, because he does not, he cannot know this connection. To produce the poem — the heterocosmic affirmation — Wordsworth cannot connect the Isle of Wight with the Rampside interlude, the death of John Wordsworth with the deaths of Marat, Robespierre, John Taylor, and Raisely Calvert, Beaumont’s sublime sea with the devouring Revolutionary deluge. To do so would be to name the contradiction which organized his culture and his particular mode of insertion/implication in that culture.

David Erdman, in a private correspondence, observed the skeptical, negative character of scholarship today, and this, ironically, among so-called historicist readers. What Erdman — a great and greatly historical scholar — dislikes about this new wave is its penchant for reading what he considers the “nothing that is not there.” What he fails to appreciate is, first, “the nothing that is” and second, the meaning of this interest in that absence everywhere. It betrays, like Erdman’s own work, an appetite for reality, not a rejection. Where it differs from Erdman’s pursuit is in its desire for a more intimate knowledge, a knowledge not of circumstance and response — a linear and nonreversible causality — but of the imbrications of those seemingly sequential and distinct moments. This is a criticism that seeks to take hold of the conditions of literary production in a profounder way than historical inquiry into manifest theme is capable of. It is a self-consciously belated criticism that sees in its necessary ignorance — its expulsion from the heaven of Romantic sympathy — a critical advantage: the capacity to know a work as neither it, nor its original readers, nor its author could know it. It is a criticism that uses the devices of deconstruction to materialize a greatly idealized corpus; or, to locate the body in Wordsworth’s poetry. In certain respects, this trend in Wordsworth studies realizes some ideals associated with feminist criticism: specifically, that movement’s adversarial tactics, its sensitivity to the interdeterminations of psychic and social forms, and its respect for the material — the physique of things — as the limit of contraction and expansion.

Yale provided the enabling concept, the method, and the machinery; Erdman and the historians discriminated and elaborated the poetry’s political and material dimension. Perhaps the two groups read too literally, “Opposition is true Friendship,” or perhaps the time was not ripe for the marriage of Heaven and Hell, re- and deconstruction. To return to my opening observation — viz, the defensive, anti-New Havenish tone of some of this year’s Romantic work — let me remark that the generation of Americans writing about Wordsworth today learned to think its subject from Bloom and Hartman. One read the historians (and Frye and Abrams) of course, but how hard it was for students trained as close readers to use that material. The great precursor, then, synecdochically speaking, was Hartman, not Erdman. I suspect that the defensive tone and the polemical tactics of this new historicist criticism confirm the syndrome Bloom himself conceived: the anxiety of influence. The dependence, and the admiration, then, persist in this form.
Wordsworth's great period poems

The vision does not signify an end to history, or 'a moment of transcendence, it describes an era when man will no longer need the institution, the "outward ritual and established forms," to realize his human character.\(^{33}\) This ultimate "overgrowing" or erasure should be read not as a negation but as the conscious product of that act, an affirmation.

"Yet the energy with which Wordsworth accepts loss, his direct unequivocal affirmation of it ... and his conscious sympathy with the pictured storm, amount to almost an amor fati, and reveal how much of power is left."\(^{34}\) I end where I began, with Hartman, who was, I think, righter about "Peele Castle" and all of Wordsworth than he perhaps knew.

Notes

Introduction

1 Historicism is, of course, an old and Hegelian word transvalued. In its original context, and by way of Althusser's usage and Benjamin's critique, historicism denotes a reconstructive project conducted along the grain. The dominant narrative and, plainly, ideological principle of this kind of discourse is that of causal connection, continuity, homogeneity, and self-coincidence. To put it crudely, historicism in its original sense defines for materialist critique an instance of empiricist and positivist idealism. (Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (London: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 49, 50; Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (London: NLB, 1968), pp. 97-144.)

One could argue, of course, that Althusser's own project, to propose "a theory of ideology in general, in the sense that Freud presented a theory of the unconscious in general" — a project Althusser justifies by reference to the "omni-historical reality" of the object, ideology, itself represents a more aggressively positivist historicism than that which Althusser locates in The German Ideology. I say "more aggressively" because not only does Althusser stress the theoretical, as opposed to historical necessity for this omni-historical character, ideology, but he aligns this necessity with the "eternity of the unconscious." (For a bracingly wrongheaded, rightminded critique of Althusser's position, see E. P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays (London: Monthly Review Press, 1978).)

Historicist critique, as practiced today by some Romanticists (and, more strikingly, by such Renaissance scholars as Stephen Greenblatt, Frank Whigham, Louis Montrose, and from a slightly different angle, Nancy Vickers) means something a good deal closer to Benjamin's anti-historicism. Within this discourse, the practically reflexive narratives that particular writers and epochs construct as their historical truth are positioned as complexly mediated representations of the structures that enable and indeed, necessitate that peculiar reflexiveness. By submitting that textual enlightenment to the concepts which a removed
critique can formulate, one produces the contextual truths which that enlightenment effaces. What distinguishes today's historicist work is its conviction that the content goes beyond the form, or that its own, operationally critical concepts are as reflexively limited as the histories on which they operate. In the Romantic idiom, we could describe this activity as a redemptive violence visited upon the mythis of the past, and anticipated from a future present. (See Terry Eagleton, *Walter Benjamin or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism* (London: Verso and NLB, 1981), pp. 44–78).

I sketch the complex history of the term 'historicist' in order to put in perspective a statement such as the following. In a critique of Jerome McGann's *The Romantic Ideology* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1983), Nina Auerbach notes that almost all the major books published this year (1983) share a historical vision that finds no need to proclaim itself and, she continues, "for most of us, the deeply political nature of Romanticism does not need this sort of overassertion." (Auerbach, "Recent Studies in the Nineteenth Century," *SEL* 34 (1984), 770–806. Auerbach is right — we have known for a long time of the "political nature of Romanticism," and that very location — so easily, dismissively general — inscribes the special ignorance which such knowledge maintains. Simply, we have not understood the "actual life of the past" in such a way as to explain its profound procedural pressures on actual literary poems and on dimensions other than manifest theme and gross form. Nor have we had till now a way to theorize those pressures and their mechanisms. McGann's "overassertion," properly contextualized, is, of course, nothing of the sort. Moreover, in linking "empiricist and historicist," and reading this "tendency" as a "repudi(ation) of the abstruse abstractions, the barking pretensions, the political myopia, associated with Yale's visionary company," Auerbach rehearses the old, idealizing positivism. In short, she misrepresents the situation of much contemporary Romantic work — its objectives, procedures, and provenance.


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**Notes to pages 4–15**


7 In "Michael," the mediations are enabled by the postulate of a poet-narrator removed temporally, sociologically, and ideologically from the chronicle he delivers.


9 Thompson, "Disenchantment or Default," pp. 155, 180.

10 I have, of course, polarized the field so drastically as to suppress the important and influential work of David Perkins, Harry Lindzenberger, Stephen Parrish, Mark Reed, Paul Sheats, and others. What I try to identify by my scheme are the spheres of influence that tend to determine the way these mediating voices get used.


12 Abrams, "Spirit of the Age," 90–118.


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**1 Insight and oversight: reading "Tintern Abbey"**


2 The poem's withholding of something to be intense upon and its sometimes strenuous phrasing are typically greeted as instances of imitative