mixtures of effects abound in aesthetics—hence the immense variety of plausible causal analyses which aestheticians devise—and merely inductive procedures would be of slight utility. Inductions from the data supplied by taste yield empirical and provisional laws the chief use of which is to guide deduction and to verify the principles deduced from established laws of human nature.

But Gerard errs, I believe, in pushing the initial inductive procedure through successive stages, ascending to more and more general laws before deriving these same results a priori; the deduction from psychological principles must accompany at each stage the empirical generalizations—indeed, a rigorous aesthetics would be far more deductive than inductive in the establishment of the axiomata media. Gerard (somewhat inconsistently with the remarks discussed above) does in fact often operate as I have suggested, and even gives theoretic justification for so doing. Thus, when he argues that taste is but one cause of character, and liable to be counteracted by other causes, he is led to observe that, “On this account, examples of a good taste joined with gross passions or a vicious character are far from being sufficient to prove that taste has no connection with morals.” This “heterogeneous composition” of good taste and bad morals causes Gerard to reflect that

all our conclusions concerning human nature must be founded on experience: but it is not necessary that every conclusion should be immediately deduced from experiment. A conclusion is sufficiently established, if it be shown that it necessarily results from general qualities of the human mind, which have been ascertained by experiment and induction. This is the natural method of establishing synthetical conclusions; especially where an effect is produced by a complication of causes. This is the case in the subject of our present enquiry. 59

Gerard had a concern, then, with method in aesthetics, though he did not develop his views so distinctly and systematically as would have been possible, nor did he apply them with entire consistency in the Essay on Taste, made up as much of that work is of eclectic borrowings not entirely reduced to system. The later Essay on Genius is a more cogent and exhaustive work, and exhibits more vividly the strengths of Gerard’s aesthetic method. 60

Chapter 6

Edmund Burke

THE WORK which, after Addison's essays, was most influential on the course of British aesthetic speculation in the eighteenth century, was Edmund Burke's A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful. Although the Sublime and Beautiful was subjected to severe enough attack—Richard Payne Knight declared that he had “never met with any man of learning, by whom the philosophy of the Inquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful was not as much despised and ridiculed, as the brilliancy and animation of its style were applauded, and admired”—it was acclaimed by Johnson (“We have an example of true criticism in Burke’s ‘Essay on the Sublime and Beautiful’ . . .” 2 ), by Reynolds (“the admirable treatise ‘On the Sublime and Beautiful’ is the only modern work thus commended in the Discourses 3”), and by Hume (who wrote of Burke as an “Irish gentleman, who wrote lately a very pretty treatise on the Sublime” 4); the discipleship of Uvedale Price is well enough known, and indeed, everyone after Burke either imitates him or borrows from him or feels it necessary to refute him.

Burke’s book, the influence of which was felt in Germany as well as in England, owed nothing to the fame of its author, for it was the first composition to come from his hand 5—and may have been sketched as early as Burke’s undergraduate days in Trinity College, Dublin. The bibliography of the Sublime and Beautiful is confused; but Theodore Moore’s complete and ingenious historical argument harmonizes all the apparently conflicting evidence, and establishes pretty conclusively that the first edition was published April 21, 1757, and the second January 10, 1759. 6

Burke’s program of inquiry is explicit. Observing that “the ideas of the sublime and beautiful were frequently confounded, and that both were indiscriminately applied to things greatly differing, and some-
times of natures directly opposite,” he proposed to remedy this confusion of ideas “from a diligent examination of our passions in our own breasts, from a careful survey of the properties of things which we find by experience to influence those passions, and from a sober and attentive investigation of the laws of nature, by which those properties are capable of affecting the body and thus of exciting our passions.” These three steps of the inquiry are readily connected with the divisions of the Sublime and Beautiful. Part i is the examination of the emotions of sublimity and beauty—of the formal cause of the two characters. Parts ii and iii investigate the properties of things productive of the emotion of sublimity (Part ii) and that of beauty (Part iii)—they are an investigation of material causes. Part iv treats of the laws in accordance with which the assigned properties excite the emotions—it treats, that is, of the efficient cause. This program is not, as some moderns have seen it, a step from the objectivism of the neoclassic to a psychological and subjective view; this whole dichotomy, applied to the aestheticians here examined, is an illusion—all the aestheticians from Addison to Kant and onwards conceive of the sublime as a feeling in the mind caused by certain properties in external objects. The real differences among these men are to be sought in the methods of argument and the causal principles which they employ.

Burke has not only a clear conception of his program, but also some awareness of the techniques of argument proper to it. He lays down, in treating the influence of proportion,

the rules which governed me in this inquiry, and which have misled me in it if I have gone astray. (1) If two bodies produce the same or a similar effect on the mind, and on examination they are found to agree in some of their properties and to differ in others, the common effect is to be attributed to the properties in which they agree, and not to those in which they differ. (2) Not to account for the effect of a natural object from the effect of an artificial object. (3) Not to account for the effect of any natural object from a conclusion of our reason concerning its uses, if a natural cause may be assigned. (4) Not to admit any determinate quantity, or any relation of quantity, as the cause of a certain effect, if the effect is produced by different or opposite measures and relations; or if these measures and relations may exist, and yet the effect may not be produced.10

It is not possible to accept these rules without some reservations. The first is the uncontrolled Method of Agreement, and ignores the possibility of plurality of causes. The fourth rule is really two: the first of these, that no given measure can be the cause if other measures also yield the effect, again denies plurality of causes; the second, that if the given measure is in some instances not followed by the effect it cannot be the cause, is just if corrected to read, “cannot be the whole cause.” This is a fragmentary system of induction at best, scarcely rising above the Method of Agreement save for a negative application of the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference. But the inadequacy of theoretical formulation of decisive inductive methods is not crucial if they are nonetheless employed in practice; and Burke does employ them, though not with the definitive results which would have followed from a conscious awareness of their implications and conditions.

The second and third rules of Burke’s listing are just consequences of an analytic philosophy, insisting upon the investigation of the parts before the whole and upon the priority of immediate to mediate causal connections. Burke’s procedure is thus analytical—to separate the components of complex objects; inductive—to determine through observation the effects of the “principles” thus isolated; experiential—to compare the results computed from these simple laws with the experienced nature of the complex objects involving them. Burke is really following what J. S. Mill terms the Inverse Deductive Method: once induction has established tentatively certain empirical generalizations, Burke deduces from (what he takes to be) established laws of human nature the middle principles which account for the empirical correlations and verify them. This method is that best adapted to the nature of aesthetic phenomena, where plurality of causes and intermixture of effects often baffle attempts at steady ascending induction. It is quite wide of the mark to describe Burke’s method as “a faulty rationalism imposed upon an incomplete empiricism” and to urge, presumably as a criticism, that “a priori principles are constantly applied, and, actually, the progress is made almost entirely because of such principles.”11 I urge, in contrast, that no progress can be made with a purely empirical and inductive method in a derivative science like aesthetics; that Burke’s effort, though inadequate and often ill-performed, is in general rightly oriented.

To his second edition Burke prefixed an essay “On Taste,” another of the many demonstrations of a standard, and appropriate enough as introduction to the Sublime and Beautiful, for as Burke remarks, “if taste has no fixed principles, if the imagination is not affected according to some invariable and certain laws, our labour is likely to be employed to very little purpose; as it must be judged an useless, if not an absurd undertaking, to lay down rules for caprice and to set up
for a legislator of whims and fancies." After a caveat against defining a priori, Burke hazards the pro tempore definition: "I mean by the word taste no more than that faculty or those faculties of the mind which are affected with, or which form a judgment of, the works of imagination and the elegant arts." This statement has the unhappy effect of confining taste to art to the exclusion of nature, unless the phrase "works of imagination" is taken in a sense licentiously broad; it is not, of course, Burke's intention so to limit taste. There follows the analysis of the faculties which are conversant with such "works"; the senses, the imagination, the judgment. The argument is, that the senses and imaginations of all men respond alike in principle to external objects, and that in consequence "it must necessarily be allowed that the pleasures and the pains which every object excites in one man, it must raise in all mankind, whilst it operates, naturally, simply, and by its proper powers only; for if we deny this, we must imagine that the same cause operating in the same manner, and on subjects of the same kind, will produce different effects, which would be highly absurd." The obvious difference among the responses of men's senses and imaginations to objects of taste are attributable either to differences in degree of natural sensibility or to differences in attention to the object; but the chief variations in taste arise from differences in judgment. Variation of judgment, however, no more in matters of taste than in matters of "naked reason" implies absence of a standard. Taste, then,

in its most general acception, is not a simple idea, but is partly made up of a perception of the primary pleasures of sense, of the secondary pleasures of the imagination, and of the conclusions of the reasoning faculty, concerning the various relations of these, and concerning the human passions, manners and actions. . . . [The] groundwork of all these is the same in the human mind; for as the senses are the great originals of all our ideas, and consequently of all our pleasures, if they are not uncertain and arbitrary, the whole groundwork of taste is common to all, and therefore there is a sufficient foundation for a conclusive reasoning on these matters.

It must be noted that Burke avoids recourse to internal senses, solving the problem wholly in terms of the conventional faculties, and in this regard Burke stands apart from Hutcheson, Gerard, and Kames. There are two ways in which aestheticians may avoid the postulation of special aesthetic faculties: by explaining aesthetic responses in terms of association of ideas, and by tracing them to the action in certain modes of other faculties. Burke, it will become clear, adopts both of these devices.

Burke's theory of the sublime and beautiful led him to reject the Addisonian tradition making novelty co-ordinate with the qualities of beauty and sublimity. Accordingly, the opening section of Burke's inquiry is devoted to the pleasure of novelty, arguing that although some degree of novelty is necessary "in every instrument which works upon the mind," the permanent attractions and repulsions of objects must depend on other sources of pain and pleasure. It is in the ensuing discussion of pleasure and pain that Burke's originality makes itself felt. His is a two-fluid theory: pain and pleasure are both positive qualities, and the removal of one is thus not equivalent to the addition of the other. "What I advance," Burke declares, "is no more than this: first, that there are pleasures and pains of a positive and independent nature; and secondly, that the feeling which results from the ceasing or diminution of pain does not bear a sufficient resemblance to positive pleasure to have it considered as of the same nature, or to entitle it to be known by the same name; and thirdly, that upon the same principle the removal or qualification of pleasure has no resemblance to positive pain." The discrimination of relative pleasure, that arising from the remission of pain, from absolute pleasure is the foundation of Burke's distinction of the sublime from the beautiful.

"Delight" and "pleasure" are the terms which Burke hoped to affix to the two species of agreeable sensation; and the next step in the argument is to specify the causes and objects of those feelings which are pleasant or delightful. Agreeing with the sentimental system of ethics, Burke finds passions both selfish and social to be natural and original in man. The selfish passions, concerned with self-preservation, turn on pain and danger—hence on delight rather than pleasure, insofar as they are agreeable at all. And it is on these that the sublime is based: "Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling." Burke does not say—note well—that the sublime is always terrible; it is either terrible, or associated with something terrible, or acts upon us like the terrible. In fact, Burke really avoids the false issue, whether fear be sublime, or humbling and incompatible with the sublime; for he insists that "when danger or pain press too nearly, they are in-
capable of giving any delight, and are simply terrible, but at certain
distances, and with certain modifications, they may be, and they are
delightful, as we every day experience.” 20 Again, Burke urges that
the self-glorying of the soul is “never more perceived, nor operates
with more force, than when without danger we are conversant with
terrible objects...” 21 Sublimity is “tranquillity tinged with ter-
ror.” 22 Gerard simultaneously with Burke was urging the agreeable-
ness of the terrific, though he gave an explanation on different prin-
ciples; before Gerard and Burke, no aesthete had found the fear-
ful, considered in itself, a source of aesthetic satisfaction. 23

The social passions, which may all in one way or another afford
positive pleasure, are of two sorts: those pertaining to “the society of
the sexes,” and those regarding “that more general society which we
have with men and with other animals, and which we may in some
sort be said to have even with the inanimate world.” 24 Beauty—hu-
man beauty—has its special function in directing the sexual feelings
towards particular individuals, though the sentiment of beauty is not
itself sexual in nature. Of the passions pertaining to general society,
three—sympathy, imitation, ambition—are of peculiar importance for
aesthetics; and of these, two—sympathy and ambition—may pro-
duce delight as well as pleasure. Sympathy causes us to feel what
others feel; imitation to do as others do, and to take pleasure in
detecting imitation; ambition to excel.

The effects of sympathy lead Burke to that persistent cruze, the
pleasure of tragedy. He cuts the knot by arguing that we delight in the
real distresses of others, not only in imitated distress; hence
“there is no spectacle we so eagerly pursue as that of some uncommon
and grievous calamity... [which] always touches with delight.
This is not an unmixed delight, but blended with no small uneas-
iness. The delight we have in such things hinders us from shunning
scenes of misery; and the pain we feel prompts us to relieve ourselves
in relieving those who suffer; and all this antecedent to any reason-
ing, by an instinct that works us to its own purposes without our con-
currence.” 25 Compulsive and instinctual attraction to suffering is a
principle noted before Burke by Hutcheson and after him by Kames,
but neither of these writers developed such a paradox as Burke’s
delight in witnessing suffering. 26 Thus with real distress; in an imi-
tated distress, as Burke truly says, the only difference can be in the
circumstance of imitation itself. It is not that consciousness of fiction
relieves us, for “the nearer [the imitation] approaches the reality, and
the further it removes us from all idea of fiction, the more perfect is

its power.” 27 Rather, the imitation as such affords pleasure, including
(I presume) that from artistry and the means of imitation. It re-
mains the case, however, that the greater part of our response is the
delight inexplicably attached to sympathy with distress, which delight
is still more keen in actuality than in poetry. This explanation runs
counter to the usual observation that the reality of a tragic scene is
painful and only the imitation agreeable; and it is not without other
problems. Not only is there the curious delight in pity itself, but the
question is suggested, why should we not bring about tragic situations
in order to experience this delight? To avoid this consequence, it ap-
pears to me that a second fiction must be introduced, a sense of duty
which will oppose so natural a desire. Burke was not (in view of these
difficulties) followed by any other writer, and Richard Payne Knight
wrote a witty and destructive analysis of Burke’s account. 28

So much for sympathy. Imitation in art provides a positive pleas-
ure often keen enough to overcome the effect of repellent originals;
Burke has no notion of conversion of the passions, however, and as
the effect of a displeasing original is thus simply subducted from the
pleasure of the imitation, there is no encouragement to artists to deal
with such subjects.

Ambition, finally, may join with the selfish passions concerned with
self-preservation to produce the sublime:

Now, whatever, either on good or upon bad grounds, tends to raise a
man in his own opinion, produces a sort of swelling and triumph that
is extremely grateful to the human mind; and this swelling is never more
perceived, nor operates with more force, than when without danger we
are conversant with terrible objects, the mind always claiming to itself
some part of the dignity and importance of the things which it contem-
plates. Hence proceeds what Longinus has observed of that gloriety and
sense of inward greatness that always fills the reader of such passages
in poets and orators as are sublime... 29

The sublime, then, is a twofold movement of the soul, a response to
the object and a self-reflection, as Baillie and Gerard had already
found it to be; it excites delight from presenting ideas of pain and
danger without actually afflicting us, and it is accompanied with self-
glorification of the soul for conceiving such objects with equanimity.

“...The passion caused by the great and sublime in nature, when
those causes operate most powerfully,” Burke declares, “is astonish-
ment; and astonishment is that state of the soul in which all its mo-
tions are suspended with some degree of horror.” 30 The very word
“astonishment” as also “awe,” “admiration,” “reverence,” “spect,” all which designate inferior effects of the sublime—implies the connection of the sublime with the terrific. Burke himself pressed the evidence of language in associating fear with astonishment and related passions.

Whatever is terrible to sight, then, is ipso facto sublime, and obscurity is in general necessary to make anything very terrible, for “it is our ignorance of things that causes all our admiration and chiefly excites our passions.” A clear idea, Burke adds in the second edition, is therefore another name for a little idea. Power, too, is a source of the sublime, because of its association with violence, pain, and terror; those instances in which power is stripped of all danger serve to prove that its influence is indeed the consequence of its association with terror. All general privations, Burke continues, are great, because they are all terrible; Vacuity, Darkness, Solitude, and Silence. Greatness of dimension, too, is sublime, and infinity fills the mind with that delightful horror which is the essential effect of sublimity, an effect which is approximated by the “artificial infinite” of succession and uniformity (as in a colonnade), the imagination continuing beyond the actual limits of the object. A work implying immense force and effort to execute it is sublime, and difficulty thus becomes by association a cause of sublimity. Yet other associations account for the sublimity of extreme light or of somber colors. Such epithets as “gloomy” and “melancholy” are repeatedly applied to the sublime, but the associations thus alluded to are never drawn out by Burke, obsessed as he is with the terrific.

The sublimity of all these properties is clearly traceable to association. Granted Burke’s fundamental position, that original sublimity is a mode of terror (anticipated pain) vividly conceived but not actually raised into a passion, it follows that such circumstances will be sublime as, through original efficacy, experience, education, or custom, are fitted to suggest terror; by more remote associations, accompaniments of such circumstances too may become sublime. The task of the aesthetician should presumably be to trace out the various classes of associations; and Burke, though he does not in Part ii attempt to educe an explicit analysis in these terms, seems certainly to point to it. The sublime, we are told, is produced by whatever is terrible, or is “conversant about” terrible objects (association of ideas), or operates like terror (association of impressions); again, everything sublime either directly suggests danger, or is a modification of power (which is associated with danger), or produces a similar effect from a “mechanical cause.” The only thing in all this which is not clearly association is the “mechanical cause” which operates like terror. Even this, however, could be given a psychological interpretation in terms of the tendency of imagination to extend and extrapolate observed tendencies (as with the “artificial infinite”).

It comes, then, as a surprise to discover, in Part iv, that association is not so much an explanation of the sublime as a confusing obstacle in the path of inquiry, one which is to be got out of the way. Burke pronounces that it would be “to little purpose to look for the cause of our passions in association, until we fail of it in the natural properties of things.” Abstractly, this is a sound methodological point: certainly find the immediate causes first, then look for the mediate and remote. But what are the immediate causes which Burke detects? Not ideal, not pathetic, not moral—but physiological. Pain and fear (we are told) consist in “an unnatural tension of the nerves” and Burke means this tension to be a literal stretching. The causal connection is reversible: if the nerves are stretched (by some “mechanical cause”) a feeling like pain or terror will be produced. All that remains is, that Burke should show how this can become agreeable; and this is easy, for it is a commonplace that moderate exercise tones up the body. To have the nerves “in proper order, they must be shaken and worked to a proper degree.” “As common labour,” Burke continues, which is a mode of pain, is the exercise of the grosser, a mode of terror is the exercise of the finer parts of the system; and if a certain mode of pain be of such a nature as to act upon the eye or the ear, as they are the most delicate organs, the affection approaches more nearly to that which has a mental cause. In all these cases, if the pain and terror are so modified as not to be actually noxious; if the pain is not carried to violence, and the terror is not conversant about the present destruction of the person, as these emotions clear the parts, whether fine or gross, of a dangerous and troublesome encumbrance, they are capable of producing delight; not pleasure, but a sort of delightful horror, a sort of tranquility tinged with terror; which, as it belongs to self-preservation, is one of the strongest of all the passions. Its object is the sublime.

Here is the system, complete in all its parts. Already difficulties crowd upon us. The sublime should be, by this account, simply a weaker degree of terror—enough to tone up but not to overstretch the nerves. But this is not conformable to experience, for an emotion
of the sublime may be far stronger than a faint emotion of terror—somewhere a qualitative difference must come in, and this cannot be on Burke's mechanical hypothesis.

Burke undertakes to show that the various sublime properties, properties appealing to all the external senses, all cause tension of the nerves. A vast object, for instance, consists of more points which must be imaged on the retina, and consequently produces a more violent vibration of that membrane. As Payne Knight later suggested with some sarcasm, one's pen a foot away makes a greater impression on the retina than Salisbury steeple at a mile, and the sheet of paper on which one writes would be more sublime than the Peak of Teneriffe. Even if we allow for the modification of the actual sense impression by habitual judgment ("improved perception")—and it is difficult to see how Burke can allow for this—there is the further difficulty that "the ideas of great and small are terms almost entirely relative to the species of the objects, which are infinite," as Burke well puts it. This is association: how is it to be reconciled with the stretching of nerves and muscles which know nothing of the species of things? The artificial infinite is fortunately susceptible of a more satisfactory explanation on Burke's hypothesis through the analogy to the percussion and vibration of stretched cords. But this fiction becomes absurd again when we read that darkness and the resulting dilatation of the pupils, by distending the muscles of the iris produce a species of pain allied to the sublime. Goldsmith pointed out that the iris really relaxed in dilatation; but Burke rejoined in his second edition with the argument that the radial antagonist muscles were distended in dilatation. One wonders whether fogged spectacles would produce sublimity; that Burke should give such a line of reasoning preference over his own obvious associational account (Part iv, sec. 14) illustrates pretty vividly the power of system to wrest data into conformity. This physiological theory was reckoned an absurdity even in the eighteenth century, and Uvedale Price, Burke's most vigorous champion, laid slight stress on the physiology, unobtrusively shifting most of the superstructure onto new foundations.

Beauty, for Burke, is "that quality or those qualities in bodies by which they cause love, or some passion similar to it." Love, in turn, is "that satisfaction which arises to the mind upon contemplating anything beautiful." This neat circle is not a flaw in the argument, however, but only indicates that the basic emotions can be designated but not described. Before entering upon his own analysis, Burke pauses to brush aside erroneous theories. He has little trouble in showing that beauty is not resolvable into proportion. The ratios of proportion must operate either mechanically, or customarily, or through fitness. But since pleasing proportions are infinitely various, and since, indeed, beauty is often most perfect when proportion is least conspicuous, proportion can not be a necessary cause of beauty. Definite measures have, then, no natural power, but custom (it might be argued) may adapt us to certain proportions within each species. Burke replies with a distinction: violation of the usual measures of a species produces deformity—but not ugliness. Conformity to these measures is mediocre, indifferent to the passions, and quite distinct from beauty. Beauty, indeed, is so far from being an adjunct of custom that it strikes us by its novelty as much as does the deformed. Proportion may be conceived, finally, as the suitableness of means to ends. Burke does not deny that perception of fitness is pleasurable—but to term fitness "beauty" is a usage figurative and improper. The snout of the hog is not lovely because adapted to its office; such fitness produces only acquiescence of the understanding and cool approbation—the imagination and passions are untouched. "On the whole," Burke concludes,

if such parts in human bodies as are found proportioned, were likewise constantly found beautiful, as they certainly are not; or if they were so situated, as that a pleasure might flow from the comparison, which they seldom are; or if any assignable proportions were found, either in plants or animals, which were always attended with beauty, which never was the case; or if, where parts were well adapted to their purposes, they were constantly beautiful, and when no use appeared, there was no beauty, which is contrary to all experience; we might conclude that beauty consisted in proportion or utility. But since, in all respects, the case is quite otherwise; we may be satisfied that beauty does not depend on these, let it owe its origin to what else it will.

It is unfortunate that Burke did not differentiate fitness from design and utility. Design, with the intellectual and moral traits it implies, and utility, with the human concerns and feelings it touches, both appeal more strongly to imagination and emotion than fitness in the more circumscribed sense. Burke's doctrine on fitness itself, however, was influential, and most later aestheticians who treated the relation at length considered it a negative beauty, absence of which is felt more keenly than its presence.

Burke is concerned also to discourage declamation about the beauty of virtue. "The general application of this quality to virtue," he
from Burke’s principles though adhering to his dichotomy. Burke himself concedes an aesthetic pleasure from largeness conjoined with all or most of the other traits of beauty; objects exhibiting this combination he terms “fine” or “speecious.” This distinction goes a good way towards resolving the apparent conflict, for the “beautiful,” the “handsome,” the “brawn” of writers not concerned to make a sharp differentiation between sublime and beautiful are much like Burke’s “fine.”

Even smoothness, where Burke finds a near consensus in his support, can be denied as a predicate of beauty. Richard Payne Knight was later to urge by a subtle argument that strictly visible beauty depends on broken light and color, that it is incompatible with the harsh reflections from smooth objects, and that the beauty of smoothness depends upon association.

Burke appears to have written this portion of the Sublime and Beautiful before Hogarth’s Analysis of Beauty came to hand, for in his second edition he drew upon Hogarth to support his contention for the beauty of gradual variation. Burke’s criticism of Hogarth is not searching, for he does not penetrate to Hogarth’s principles, and his correction of Hogarth for allowing angularity to be beautiful (Hogarth does admit an inferior degree of beauty to various angularity) is another logomachy like that over the beauty of large objects. Burke himself admits another category, the “elegant,” which is characterized by regularity, and regularity may well be—usually is—angular. “When any body is composed of parts smooth and polished, without pressing upon each other, and without showing any ruggedness or confusion, and at the same time affecting some regular shape, I call it elegant. It is closely allied to the beautiful, differing from it only in this regularity; which, however, as it makes a very material difference in the affection produced, may very well constitute another species. Under this head I rank those delicate and regular works of art, that imitate no determinate object in nature, as elegant buildings and pieces of furniture.” Here again Burke is led by his desire to oppose the beautiful to the sublime to limit the beautiful very narrowly, and to cast into other and inferior categories much which other writers comprehend under beauty.

Beyond the physical beauty on which Burke’s emphasis principally falls, there is a beauty of expression in the face and a beauty of grace of posture and motion. And these visual beauties (like visual sublimity) have their analogies in the other senses. There is a beauty of touch consisting in smoothness, softness, gradual variation, mod-
erate warmth; a beauty of sound, clear, even, smooth, and weak, without any great variety or quick transitions to disturb "that sinking, that melting, that languor, which is the characteristic effect of the beautiful as it regards every sense"; and a beauty, finally, of smell and taste—smoothness and sweetness. These beauties of the various senses serve once again as the instances to which the Method of Agreement is to be applied in ferreting out the common causes. The common effect—an inward sense of melting and languor (together with a somewhat comic collocation of outward manifestations)—suggests at once, to a mind attuned to the suggestion, "that beauty acts by relaxing the solids of the whole system." As before, Burke confirms this hypothesis by showing that each constituent of beauty has separately a tendency to relax the fibers: smoothness to touch is manifestly relaxing, and heads the train; smoothness and sweetness to taste, gradual variation, smallness, and color follow in sequence.

The inferiority of fineness to beauty is accounted for through the combination in fineness of qualities which are inconsistent in their physiological effects: "The affection produced by large bodies adorned by the spoils of beauty, is a tension continually relieved; which approaches to the nature of mediocrity." Presumably the regularity of the elegant, by taking off from the various and even flow of the beautiful, is similarly inferior. And although the sublime and beautiful are often commingled, each very naturally produces its best effect when pure: "If the qualities of the sublime and beautiful are sometimes found united, does this prove that they are the same; does it prove that they are any way allied; does it prove even that they are not opposite and contradictory?"

A fifth part of the Sublime and Beautiful treats of the production of sublimity and beauty through words, and is a conventional application of the associational theory to language. Understandably, however, it is this part of the treatise which has proved most attractive to modern literary scholars. McKenzie judges this the most interesting part of the inquiry because Burke is "directly opposed to the notion of his contemporaries that the power of poetry depends upon specific imagery." And William Guild Howard finds here the germs of Lessing’s differentiations of poetry from painting: "Painting, then," Howard concludes, "presents ideas through clear images affecting the mind but little; poetry stirs the emotions through obscure images, or without raising images at all."

Burke himself had urged simply that words produce three effects in the mind of the hearer—the sound, the picture, and the affection of soul produced by either or both of the foregoing. In terms of their meanings, words are distinguished by Burke into aggregate ("such as represent many simple ideas united by nature to form some one determinate composition"), simple abstract (which "stand for one simple idea of such compositions"), and compound abstract ("formed by an union, an arbitrary union of both the others, and of the various relations between them"). Aggregate words, that is, are names of substances, abstract words of attributes; simple abstracts are the names of single qualities or connected groups (for "square"—one of Burke’s instances—is surely no simple idea!); compound abstracts are names of complexes which are not even apparently simple. Now, the compound abstracts produce only the first and third of the possible effects of words; they operate "not by presenting any image to the mind, but by having from use the same effect on being mentioned, that their original has when it is seen." And though aggregate and simple abstract words can raise images, they commonly do not do so in the hurry of actual use, and operate just as do the compound abstract. The power of words to raise affections is little hindered by the absence of the image, however; the "picturesque connection is not demanded, because no real picture is formed, nor is the effect of the description at all the less upon this account." Words, indeed, may affect us even more strongly than the things they represent, for they carry the contagion of sympathy and impassioned expression, represent things which may be seldom or never experienced in reality, and combine circumstances in a way more affecting than nature.

This whole account is associational—compare it, for instance, with Hume’s study of abstract words in the Treatise of Human Nature. When McKenzie speaks of Burke’s "disregard of association," he is thinking of the association of particular ideas in the form of images, instead of association of mental habits with the sound of words; it may be granted, however, that Burke deserves credit for popularizing an important idea in criticism when the general taste was, as McKenzie says, "for images that were accurate, clear, vivid, and special." How in thinking that the usual absence of distinct images in poetry allocates poetry to the sublime, and that the clear ideas of painting allocate it to the beautiful; in noting that "paintings are apt to be comparatively small, and suggestive of smoothness; their figures are of undulating, or at least not angular outline; they
are delicate, not glaring, but diversified in color,” Howard confuses inextricably the painting as an object with the painting as an imitation.  

Burke never revised or expanded his theory after the second edition. When years later, in 1789, Malone proposed to him to rework the Sublime and Beautiful, “which the experience, reading, and observation of thirty years could not but enable him to improve considerably,” Burke replied that the whole bent of his mind had been turned from such subjects so that he was less fitted for such speculations than in youth, and that in any event “the subject was then new, but several writers have since gone over the same ground, Lord Kames and others.” Somewhat earlier, however—in 1773—Burke had agreed to write an article on aesthetics, including an abstract of the Sublime and Beautiful, for a “Dictionary of the Arts and Sciences” which Goldsmith projected but which was never actually undertaken. It is very probable that Burke would have had nothing to add to his treatise in later life, and it is very doubtful that he would have desired to subtract from it; the book stands an isolated monument of speculation. There is a tendency among aestheticians and scholars, unhappily, to regard the Sublime and Beautiful as valuable chiefly for its collection of aesthetic data but as negligible philosophically. Lessing, writing to Moses Mendelssohn, said of Burke as early as 1758, “Das heisst ohne Zweifel sehr commode philosophiren! Doch, wenn schon des Verfassers Grundsätze nicht viel taugen, so ist sein Buch doch als eine Sammlung aller Eräugnungen und Wahrnehmungen, die der Philosoph bey dergleichen Untersuchungen als unstreitig annehmen muss, ungemein brauchbar. Er hat alle Materialen zu einem guten System gesammlet....” And this condescending judgment has been often echoed since. I cannot share it; if the physiological theory of Part IV were replaced by a more thorough analysis of association—if it were simply deleted—the Sublime and Beautiful would remain a brilliant if incomplete system, of merit not historical but absolute and permanent.

**Chapter 7**

Lord Kames

The Elements of Criticism of Henry Home, Lord Kames, remains today one of the most elaborate and systematic treatises on aesthetics and criticism of any age or nation; and it ranks, alongside Archibald Alison’s Essays on Taste, as the major effort of philosophical criticism in eighteenth-century Britain. The Elements went through six editions within a dozen years of its first publication in 1762; and more than thirty subsequent editions in the United States and Britain, editions both complete and abridged, testify to the widespread and prolonged reputation of Lord Kames. But with the gradual predominance of German philosophy during the nineteenth century, the Elements lost its influence among thinkers, though it continued in use as a textbook; and Bosanquet, writing in 1892, mentions only a few scattered thoughts of “Kames,” treating them as stimuli to or anticipations of Lessing.

Notwithstanding the obscurity in which the Elements is now involved, the extensive and various aesthetic and critical system it propounds remains of singular philosophical interest. Kames had some pretensions as a metaphysician, and the examination of his aesthetics should begin, accordingly, with an exposition of his metaphysics; that metaphysics is developed in the first two chapters and Appendix (“Terms Defined or Explained”) of the Elements, and in the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion (Edinburgh, 1751). The Appendix is of especial importance, for the “definitions” are arranged not as a glossary but in a logical sequence which gives a succinct conspectus of the system.

Like other philosophers after Descartes, Kames seeks principles in the contents of the mind. And although he writes before publication of any of the treatises of the Scottish school, he anticipates the Scottish answers to Hume; his philosophy has a reactionary cast, and his
where uniformity is studied, though it cannot have any degree of this effect; he acknowledges that beauty resides only in a composed variety; which necessarily implies a mixture of uniformity" (ibid., pp. 34–35n). Gerard overlooks that he terms “uniformity” includes also what Hogarth terms “simplicity,” and that Hogarth conceives the value of regularity in forms merely decorative.

34. Ibid., p. 47.
35. Ibid., p. 42.
36. Ibid., p. 43.
38. Ibid.
40. Ibid., pp. 54–55.
41. Ibid. (3d ed.), Appendix, pp. 283–84.
42. Ibid. (1st ed.), i. 5, p. 64.
43. Ibid., ii. 7, ed. cit., p. 148.
44. Ibid., ii. 1, ed. cit., p. 89.
45. Ibid., ii. 2, ed. cit., p. 96.
47. Ibid., i. 7, ed. cit., pp. 77–78.
49. Ibid., p. 58.
50. McKenzie (Critical Responsiveness, pp. 268, 296–97) is also unaware of the fourth part of the Essay on Taste.
52. Ibid., iv. 2, ed. cit., p. 216.
53. Ibid., iv. 5, ed. cit., p. 251.
54. See especially the final chapter of Lord Kames’s Elements of Critical (and infra, pp. 119–20) and the Introduction to Richard Payne Knight’s Analytical Inquiry into the Principles of Taste (and infra, pp. 254–55).
56. Ibid., p. 185n.
57. Ibid., p. 184.
58. John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Bk. VI, Chaps. 9 and 10 (“Of the Physical, or Concrete Deductive Method” and “Of the Inverse Deductive, or Historical Method”).
60. The Essay on Genius is, as a whole, not closely enough related to the present study to admit of its being treated here. The general plan of the book can perhaps be grasped by noting that genius itself is an efficient cause, and that the three parts of the treatise, “Of the Nature of the Varieties of Genius,” and “Of the Kinds of Genius,” deal with the faculties involved in genius (material cause), the modifications and compounds of these faculties (formal cause), and the ends which marshaled these combinations into distinct species of genius (final cause).

Chapter 6

5. The satire on Lord Bolingbrooke, A Vindication of Natural Society (London, 1756) preceded it from the press; Burke appears to have intended publication of the Sublime and Beautiful early in 1756, but put it off in order to write and publish The Vindication.
8. Burke himself uses the term “efficient cause” loosely; “when I speak of cause, and efficient cause, I only mean certain affections of the mind, that cause certain changes in the body; or certain powers and properties in bodies, that work a change in the mind” (Sublime and Beautiful [text of the second edition], iv. 1, in The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke [London: Oxford, 1906], I, 175). He does not distinguish explicitly the object from the principles by which the object acts, and accordingly remarks that certain proportions are alleged to be “the efficient cause of beauty” (ibid., iv. 4, in Works, I, 144)—where in strict accuracy he should say “material cause.”
9. Monk (The Sublime, p. 98) sees Burke as an advance towards subjectivism: “although he cannot, by the very nature of his reasoning, refer beauty and sublimity to the perceiving mind alone, as Kant was to do and as Hume had already done, he does, perform, concentrate most of his attention on the effect rather than on the qualities of objects.”
13. Ibid., p. 67.
14. Ibid., p. 68.
15. Ibid., p. 78. Gerard (Essay on Taste [3d ed.], iv. 3, ed. cit., pp. 220–24) gives a clear précis of Burke’s argument, but considers that Burke is trying to explain away diversities of sentiment, and that he minimizes the transformations imagination effects with the data of sense in presenting images “which the senses could not possibly exhibit, and which give pleasure or disgust on totally different
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principles." It is certainly true that Burke's argument is sketchy in dealing with
imagination and judgment.

16. Burke, Sublime and Beautiful, i. 1, in Works, i, 84.
17. ibid., i. 4, in Works, i, 88.
18. ibid., i. 7, in Works, i, 91.
19. Cf. supra, pp. 74-75 for discussion of Baillie's and Gerard's views on
this topic, and infra, pp. 272-73 for an account of Richard Payne Knight's cri-
tique of the terrific sublime.
20. Burke, Sublime and Beautiful, i. 7, in Works, i, 91-92.
21. ibid., i. 17, in Works, i, 102.
22. ibid., iv, 7, in Works, i, 181.
23. Hutcheson, it might be remarked, had tried to show that horrid objects
affect us unpleasantly only through fear for ourselves or compassion for others
when reason or association makes us apprehend danger; when the fear is removed
by reasoning or experience, such objects may become pleasing. Hutcheson's an-
alysis agrees with Burke's in finding agreeable objects which might be are not
now fearulful; it contrasts with Burke's in that Hutcheson is not concerned with
differentiating two modes of agreeableness, and considers that the fear, once dis-
pelled practically, has no longer any influence whatever. (See Inquiry, i. 6, p, 67.)
24. Burke, Sublime and Beautiful, i, 8, in Works, i, 92.
25. ibid., i. 14, in Works, i, 98.
26. For Hutcheson, see supra, pp, 33-34; for Kames, infra, pp. 113-16.
27. Burke, Sublime and Beautiful, i. 15, in Works, i, 99.
28. Knight, Analytical Inquiry, iii. 1, 1-13, ed. cit., pp. 318-30 and through-
out iii. 1.
29. Burke, Sublime and Beautiful, i. 17, in Works, i, 102-3.
30. ibid., ii. 1, in Works, i, 108.
31. Samuel Johnson's A Dictionary of the English Language . . (London, 1755)
gives evidence of the connection of all these feelings with fear. "Astonish-
ment" is defined as "Amazement; confusion of mind from fear or wonder"; "amazement" as "Such a confused apprehension as does not leave reason in full
force; extreme fear; horror"; "awe" as "Reverential fear"; &c. Johnson is un-
illuminating on "sublimity" itself. He gives three meanings: (1) "Height of
place; local elevation"; (2) "Height of nature; excellence"; (3) "Loftiness of
style or sentiment." To the phrase, "the sublime," he assigns only the meaning
"The grand or lofty stile," remarking that "The sublime is a Gallician, but now
naturalized." There are no changes in any of these definitions in later editions.
32. See Burke, Sublime and Beautiful, ii. 2, in Works, i, 109, the passage be-
inning "Indeed terror is in all cases whatsoever, either more openly or latently
the ruling principle of the sublime," and continuing to the end of the section.
This passage was added in the second edition, but the same etymological point
was made in the first more briefly (ibid., iv, 7, in Works, i, 181).
33. ibid., ii [4], in Works, i, 112 and 114.
34. ibid., ii. 6, in Works, i, 121.
35. ibid., ii. 5, in Works, i, 115.
36. ibid., iv, 2, in Works, i, 176.
37. ibid., iv, 3, in Works, i, 177.
38. ibid., iv, 6, in Works, i, 180.
son defines it "1. Pleasing with minuter beauties," and for "Elegance, Elegancy, he gives "Beauty of art; rather soothing than striking; beauty without grandeur," none of which definitions implies regularity. Johnson's definitions correspond, in- cidentally, to the sense Reynolds gives the term "elegant" when he contrasts it with the sublime.

58. It does not appear to me conformable to usage to term warmth "beautiful." Softness, though of itself tactile, has visual signs and is appreciated as a visual beauty; smoothness and gradual variation are both visual and tactile; but warmth has no connection with sight (or hearing) and therefore none with what is usually felt to be beautiful, being only a pleasing organic sensation having a vague analogy—like sweetness of taste—with the beautiful.

59. Burke, Sublime and Beautiful, iii. 25, in Works, I, 171.
60. Ibid., iv. 19, in Works, I, 195.
62. Ibid., iii. 27, in Works, I, 172-73; this passage was added in the second edition.
64. Howard, "Burke among the Forerunners of Lessing," PMLA, XIX (1907), 614.
68. Hume, Treatise, i. 1. 7.
70. Howard, "Burke among the Forerunners of Lessing," PMLA, XIX (1907), 614.
72. Bryant, Burke and His Literary Friends, pp. 95-96, based on James Parton, The Life of Oliver Goldsmith (2 vols. in one; London, 1837), II, 428, other sources.

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1. The first six editions, those of bibliographical significance, are dated 1763, 1765, 1769, 1774, and 1785; there was also an unauthorized Dublin edition in 1772. See the (incomplete) list of editions in Helen Whitecomb Ramsay, The Critical Theory of Lord Kames ("Smith College Studies in Modern Languages," XXII, Nos. 1-4 [Northampton, Mass.: Smith College, 1944-41]), 137-39.